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THE "SERVICES RENDERED" PROVISION IN THE BROKERAGE
SECTION OF THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Henry J. Bison, Jr.*
No expression in the Robinson-Patman Act has received more attention
than the "for services rendered" provision in section 2(c).' For many years it
has been an important issue in a considerable amount of litigation. Various
efforts have been made to interpret the "services rendered" terminology as a
general exception in the brokerage section, which permits buyers and their agents
to receive brokerage in one form or another on their purchases. These attempts
have not met with success, and some have concluded that the "services rendered"
provision has been read out of the act.'
Section 2(c) applies to a buyer who receives brokerage or other compensation in its place from a seller, or his intermediary, on the buyer's purchases. It also
relates to the paying of such brokerage by a seller. The question presented is
whether the words "except for services rendered in connection with the sale or
purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise" permit a buyer to receive (and a
seller to grant) brokerage or any allowance or discount in place of brokerage
on his purchases. Does section 2(c) absolutely prohibit a buyer or his agent
from receiving "anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof" from a seller or his
agent on the buyer's purchases? Can a buyer render services to a seller in connection with the buyer's purchases to justify his receiving brokerage from a
seller?
To fully understand section 2(c) one must consider the legislature's intent
in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act. It has been stated that the basic purpose
of the act is
to restore, so far as possible, equality of opportunity in business by strengthening antitrust laws and by protecting trade and commerce against unfair
trade practices and unlawful price discrimination, and also against restraint
and monopoly for the better protection of consumers, workers, and independent producers, manufacturers, merchants, and other businessmen.'
* Member, District of Columbia Bar, Maryland Bar; B.S., Miami University, 1941; M.A.,
Ohio State University, 1942; LL.B., Georgetown University Law School, 1946; General Counsel,
National Association of Retail Grocers; partner, Bison & Quinlan, Washington, D.C. Mr. Bison
is the author of "Economic Protective Power of States Under the Commerce Clause," which
appeared in volume thirty-eight of the Georgetown Law Journal.
1 Section 2(c) provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu
thereof except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods,
wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent,
representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact
for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such
transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
(Emphasis added.)
49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964).
2 ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 188 (1955).

3 H.R. .P. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936).
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The aim of section 2(c) is to prevent abuse of the brokerage function. Prior
to enactment of the law it was the practice of certain buyers to demand the
allowance of brokerage on their purchases.4 Sometimes this involved payments
to fictitious brokers who turned them over to their employers. This was deemed
to be only one method of abusing the brokerage function. Section 2 (c) is phrased
broadly to cover all means by which brokerage could be used to effect price
discrimination.5
I. Appellate Decisional Law
Appellate adjudications directly on this issue have, for almost three decades,
unanimously held that section 2(c) expresses an absolute prohibition against
a buyer - either directly or through one acting as his agent - receiving brokerage, or other compensation in lieu thereof, from a seller on the buyer's own
purchases.' To interpret the "services rendered" provision as a general exception allowing buyers to receive brokerage was regarded as contrary to the purpose
of the law. The Fourth Circuit contended:
If it were a sufficient basis to bring the allowance of brokerage commissions within the [for services rendered] eziception of the section, every purchasing agent for a chain of stores might lawfully receive such commissions;
for he does for the stores of his chain precisely what is done by Oliver [in
this case acting as an agent for a group of buyers] for the subscribers to
its service and benefits the sellers in making sales in precisely the same
way. We have no doubt that it was just this sort of thing that it was the
purpose of the act to preventT
In interpreting section 2(c), the courts have adopted various modes of
reasoning. One basis is that buyers and their agents have an interest in conflict
with sellers' which prevents them from rendering services to sellers in such a

manner as to justify buyers receiving brokerage on their own purchases.' Thus,
one court held that a buyer may not be compensated for services rendered by
4 Id. at 15.
5 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 169 (1960).
6 Western Fruit Growers Sales Co. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 907 (1964); Independent Grocers Alliance Distrib. Co. v. FTC, 203 F.2d 941 (7th Cir.
1953); Modem Marketing Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 '(7th Cir. 1945); FTC v. Herzog,
150 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1945); Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945); Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12
(6th Cir. 1943); Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940); WebbCrawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940); Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625
'(1940); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC,
96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
7 Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 770 (4th Cir. 1939).
8
We may not be in as intimate touch with the ways of commerce as the Commission, but we would be naive indeed if we believed that buyers would have any great
solicitude for the welfare of their commercial antagonists, sellers. The seller wants the
highest price he can get and the buyer wants to buy as cheaply as he can, and to
achieve their antagonistic ends neither expects the other, or can be expected, to lay all
his cards face up on the table. Battle of wits is the rule.
Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 55-56 (1st Cir. 1964).
9 The Report of the House Judiciary Committee explained the reasoning for this concept
by pointing out that in a sales transaction
the positions of buyer and seller are by nature adverse, and it is a contradiction in
terms incompatible with his natural function for an intermediary to claim to be ren-
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his agents who, it was claimed, acted also as agents of the seller.'" The court
said:
It is obvious that dual representation by agents opens a wide field
for fraud and oppression. Conflicting interests are always engaged when
an attempt is made by buyers and sellers to arrive at a market price for
commodities. We entertain no doubt that it was the intention of Congress
to prevent dual representation by agents purporting to deal on behalf of
both buyer and seller. For this reason paragraph (c) is framed by disjunctives. The edge of the paragraph cuts two ways, prohibiting the payment or receipt of commissions, discounts or brokerage to the adversary
party by the other's agent. The phrase "except for services rendered" is
employed by Congress to indicate that if there be compensation to an
agent it must be for bona fide brokerage, viz., for actual services rendered
to his principal by the agent. The agent cannot serve two masters, simultaneously rendering services in an arm's length transaction to both. While
the phrase, "for services rendered," does not prohibit payment by the seller
to his broker for bona fide brokerage services, it requires that such service
be rendered by the broker to the person who has engaged him. In short,
a buying and selling service cannot be combined in one person."'
The legislative history of the brokerage clause supports this view. Congressman Utterback, who was in charge of the legislation in the House of Representatives and submitted the House report on the bill for the Committee on the
Judiciary stated:
The bill prohibits payment or allowance of brokerage or commission except
for services rendered. As explained more fully in the report of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, this refers to true brokerage services rendered
in fact for the party who pays for them, whether he be an agent employed
and paid by the seller to find market outlets or one employed and paid
by the buyer to find sources of supply.12
Thus, the "services rendered" provision in section 2(c) was interpreted to
qualify the prohibition therein so as to allow a seller or a buyer to pay brokerage
to his agent for services he actually renders to his principal.
According to informed commentators this construction has been approved
by the appellate courts. 3 The courts have held that services rendered by buyers
and their agents are in connection with their "own purchase, ownership or
resale of the goods; and these services it renders, not to those from whom the
goods are purchased, but to itself." 4 Such benefits as sellers receive are either

dering services for the seller when he is acting in -fact for or under the control of the
buyer, and no seller can be expected to pay such an intermediary so controlled for such
services unless compelled to do so by coercive influences in compromise of his natural
interest.
H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1936).
10 Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939).
11 Id. at 674-75.
12 80 CONG. REC. 9418 (1936).
13 ATr'y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRUST REP. 188, 192 (1955).
14 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1945). See Western
Fruit Growers Sales Co. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1963); Modem Marketing Servs., Inc.
v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667
(3d Cir. 1939) ; Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
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rendered as a gratuity,"5 donated, 6 or incidental to the purchase and sale.'
One thread that runs through appellate interpretations of the "services
rendered" provision is the fundamental concern of Congress to prevent the diversion of brokerage - or benefits derived therefrom - to buyers who would be
able, because of their purchasing power, to gain an advantage over competitors.
Such diversion would force a higher disproportionate share of the sellers'
selling costs, on buyers who were discriminated against, with sales to favored
buyers bearing less than their appropriate share. The courts have construed the
provision so as to effectuate the act's primary purpose of preventing this result.
Even where it may be conceded that buyers or their agents rendered a
service to sellers, courts have construed the prohibition as preventing buyers
receiving brokerage from a seller or a seller's agent. Commenting on the contention that "except for services rendered" reflects congressional recognition
that a buyer or his agent may perform services for a seller in a sales transaction
for which a seller may pay and a buyer may receive brokerage, one court
observed:
The construction contended for makes much of its [brokerage section]
language meaningless; it does violence to the purpose of the Act and has
been explicitly rejected in other circuits. It is plain enough that the paragraph, [Section 2(c)] taken as a whole, is framed to prohibit the payment
of brokerage in any guise by one party to the other, or the other's agent,
at the same time expressly recognizing and saving the right of either party
to pay his own agent for services rendered in connection with the sale or
purchase.' 8
In Oliver Bros. v. FTC, the Fourth Circuit said:
And even if it were true that 'Oliver rendered services to the sellers,
we do not think that this would change the situation. No one would contend that, without violating this section, a broker representing the seller
could give his commissions to the buyer; for in such case the action of the
broker would be the action of his principal, the seller, and would amount
to the allowance of commissions by the seller to the other party to the
transaction in direct violation of the statutory provision. As we have seen,
it constitutes a clear violation of the section for the buyer to receive commissions allowed an agent who represents him alone. If, therefore, the
buyer may not receive commissions allowed either his own agent or the
agent of the seller, it would seem to follow necessarily that he may not
receive commissions allowed a broker who is the agent of both.' 9
Without a single contrary decision, the appellate courts have held that the exception in section 2(c) of payments "for services rendered" does not apply to services
rendered by a buyer, or a buyer's representative, to a seller on the buyer's purchases.2"
15 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 611 (4th Cir. 1945).
16 Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 766 (4th Cir. 1939).
17 Modern Marketing Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970, 978 (7th Cir. 1945).
18 Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393, 398 (1st Cir. 1940).
19 102 F.2d 763, 770 (4th Cir. 1939).
20 One lower court has taken a contrary view. It held that jobbers who were also' buyers
rendered a brokerage service to the seller, viz., bringing buyer and seller together, for which they
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The dictum of the Supreme Court in the original Broch case dealing with
the "services rendered" exception 2 has been interpreted as authority for holding
that a buyer might render brokerage services to a seller to justify receiving a
brokerage payment or discount.22 However, the majority opinion emphasizes
that section 2(c) covers all means by which brokerage could be used to effect
price discrimination.2 ' Moreover, in applying section 2(c) to direct as well as
indirect allowances by a seller's broker to a buyer, the Court rejected a construction that would have removed one of the "absolute" bans of the section.2"
Thus, the use of the Broch case as authority for the doctrine that the "services
rendered" exception allows buyers to receive brokerage on their purchases appears
to be based on a strained construction. It was not a case where the buyer claimed
or received any brokerage allowance or discount as compensation for services.
II. Identifying Gases Cognizable Under Section 2(c)
While appellate courts have consistently rejected attempts to construe the
"services rendered" exception in section 2(c) as permitting the diversion of
brokerage, or an allowance in lieu thereof, to buyers on their purchases, it is
important to recognize that section 2(c) covers only anything of value as a
commission, brokerage or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in
lieu thereof.2 It does not apply to a payment which is not brokerage or to an
allowance not given or received in the place of brokerage.
The primary question is not whether a buyer has rendered serviceswhatever they may be -to
a seller, but whether the payment, allowance or
discount amounted to a direct or indirect payment of brokerage by one party
to the opposite party in a sale or purchase. The answer to this question is of
crucial importance because buyers may receive payments or allowances from
sellers, e.g., cooperative merchandising payments permitted under section 2(d),
can receive a commission from the seller. The court gave great weight to its- finding that the
jobber-buyers resell only at a price fixed by the seller. It developed the anomalous interpretation that the "for services rendered" exception applies to a buyer receiving brokerage on his
purchases if the buyer resells the merchandise at a price fixed by the seller. The inevitable consequence of this theory is to promote price rigidity and uniformity. It raises a host of problems
relating to resale price maintenance. Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 238
F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960).
21
There is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the seller or to the
respondent nor that anything in its method of dealing justified its getting a discriminatory price by means of a reduced brokerage charge. We would have quite a different
case if there were such evidence and we need not explore the applicability of § 2(c) to
such circumstances.
FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 173 (1960).
22 Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 238 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
23 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 169 (1960).
24 An interesting and frequently ignored aspect of the Broch case on the question of
whether buyers may render services to sellers and receive brokerage allowances as compensation
for such services is that the minority opinion by four members of the court expressed the view
that under the statutory scheme in section Z(c), neither a buyer nor his intermediary can perform legitimate brokerage services for a seller to provide an exemption under the "services
rendered" provision. Id. at 181 (dissenting opinion).
25 "Section 2(c) is narrowly drawn to condemn the practice of exchanging brokerage between buyer and seller, whether the exchange be an open payment or disguised as a discount or
allowance." Western Fruit Growers Sales Co. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 67, 69 (9th Cir. 1963).
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which do not involve, directly or indirectly, any payment of brokerage. 26 A
discriminatory preference may not be cognizable at all under section 2(c). The
question as to whether a competitive advantage was given a buyer through the
payment of brokerage, or an allowance in lieu thereof, must be determined by
examination of the facts and circumstances in each case. One cannot presume
the nexus between a preferential payment and the diversion of brokerage. Indeed, there must be substantial evidence in the record to support any inference
that concessions received by a buyer were in lieu of brokerage." The mere fact
that a buyer's strong purchasing power enabled him to buy at favorable prices
will not warrant finding a violation of 2(c).2" Every reduction in price, coupled
with a reduction in brokerage, does not compel the conclusion that an allowance
in lieu of brokerage has been granted. 29 However, a fact of this importance
cannot be overlooked, and where a price reduction is offset by the amount of
reduced brokerage the coincidence must be satisfactorily explained by the one
charged with a brokerage violation.30 Where a price reduction is tantamount
to a discriminatory receipt of brokerage by a buyer, the absolute ban of 2(c)
may apply. 3
The law does not allow the circumvention of the brokerage section by subterfuges involving indirect discounts in lieu of brokerage. The mere fact that the
documents recording the sale make no mention of brokerage or compensation
in lieu thereof will not prevent a finding that such an allowance was given when
the facts surrounding the transaction support this conclusion.12 The true character of the payment or allowance depends on all the facts involved, including the
relationship of the parties, their customary business practices, deviations therefrom and their dealings with customers and suppliers. Self-serving notations on
invoices stating the purpose of an allowance are not conclusive in this regard. 3
The Thomasville Chair case 4 is important to consider at this point. It involved the application of section 2(c) to a manufacturer which granted a lower
price to approximately four percent of its purchasers and accorded its salesmen
a fifty percent lower commission on sales to these purchasers. The Fifth Circuit
held that the reduction in commissions accompanied by a reduction in price
could not result in a violation of section 2(c) unless the price reduction was
shown to be unjustified under section 2(a) on the basis of differences in the
costs of sales, including the commission differential, resulting from differing
methods or quantities in which the goods were sold or delivered. Thus, in the
context of this case, the court read the cost defense of section 2(a) into section
26 "There is no necessity for calling something brokerage that is not." Robinson v. Stanley
Home Prods., Inc., 272 F.2d 601, 604 (1st 'Cir. 1959). The corollary to this is that there is no
necessity for calling brokerage something that it is not. See FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster
Co., 282 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1960); In re Whitney & Co., 273 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1959).
27 Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963).
28 Id. at 414.
29 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 175 (1960).
30 FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 282 F.2d 595 '(9th Cir. 1960).
31 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 176 (1960).
32 In re Whitney & Co., 273 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1959).
33 FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 282 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1960); Flotill Prods.,
Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
16970 '(F.T.C. June 26, 1964).
34 Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962).
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2(c). It did this notwithstanding a clear holding by the Supreme Court in the
Broch case that: "Section 2(c) ... is independent of § 2(a) and was enacted
by Congress because § 2(a) was not considered adequate to deal with abuses
of the brokerage function." 5 Furthermore, the majority opinion in the Broch
case specifically disapproved fusing the provisions of 2(a), which permits the
defense of cost justification, with those of 2(c), which does not."8 Despite this,
the court in the Thomasville Chair case found that on the facts of the case
before it no violation of section 2(c) would result unless the price differences
involved were not justified under the cost defense proviso in section 2(a).
This case is important because of the Federal Trade Commission's memorandum accompanying its dismissal of the complaint. The memorandum contained the following statement:
We read the Court of Appeals' decision as holding that the Commission, in a case in which it is alleged that a seller has violated Section
2(c) of the Clayton Act by passing on a reduction in brokerage to favored
buyers in the form of a discriminatory price reduction, may not rely solely
on the fact that the seller has paid less brokerage on the sales at the lower
price, but must establish a causal relationship between the reduced brokerage and the reduced sales price. The Commission does not, however,
acquiesce in the opinion of the Court of Appeals as such, which contains
dicta with which the Commission does not necessarily agree. Since the
Commission does not believe that the public interest would be advanced
by a further proceeding to establish whether respondent has violated Section
2(c), the complaint must be dismissed.37
Although the Commission did not acquiesce in the opinion of the court,
there is some basis for questioning the assertion that the court's decision was
based on a requirement that there be "a causal relationship between the reduced
brokerage and the reduced sales price." It appears more reasonable to conclude
that the court was not concerned with what caused the reduced prices involved,
but rather whether they were justified under the cost defense of section 2(a).
It seems to have taken the position that, because section 2(a) permits price
differentials based on savings in selling costs resulting from differing methods
of distribution, a seller may be free to pass on to selected buyers, in the form of
a price reduction, any differential between his ordinary brokerage expense and
the brokerage expense which he pays on sales to such buyers. It was precisely
this contention with respect to a seller's broker that the Supreme Court rejected
in the Broch case." Thus, although Congress intended that section 2 (c) prohibit
the transmission of brokerage to buyers, the court in Thomasville would allow
the same thing to be accomplished under 2(a). This would deprive 2(c) of
any substance. On this basis, the opinion in this case actually offers little constructive guidance in construing section 2(c). It certainly lacks any precedential
authority.
35
36
37
38

363 U.S. 166, 171 (1960).
Id. at 176.
3 TRADE REG. REP. %16624 (F.T.C. Oct. 22, 1963).
363 U.S. 166 (1960).
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III. Federal Trade Commission Interpretations
The most recent and conclusive indication that the FTC does not interpret
the "services rendered" provision as a general exception in section 2(c) permitting buyers to receive brokerage on their purchases is contained in its Trade
Practice Rules for the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Industry, which were promulgated April 15, 1965.39
Section 74.2 (a) (1), (b) and (c), entitled Prohibited Brokerage, provides
as follows:
(a) (1) The foregoing provision [section 2(c)] prohibits, in connection
with the sale of goods, the payment of a brokerage fee or the granting of an
allowance or discount in lieu of a brokerage fee (i) By the seller to the buyer; and
(ii) By the buyer to the seller; and
(iii) By the seller or the buyer to an agent, representative or
other intermediary who is working for or in behalf of the other party
to the sales transaction, or is subject to such other party's direct or
indirect control; and
(iv) By an agent of the seller to the other party to the sales
transaction, either through paying such other party all or a portion
of his fee or through accepting a reduced fee which results in a reduction in the price by the seller.
The provision of this paragraph (a) also prohibits the receipt of such
a commission, brokerage fee, discount or allowance under the conditions
prescribed.
(b) The paying or granting or receiving or accepting of any commission, brokerage fee, or allowance or discount in lieu thereof, such as
is proscribed by paragraph (a) of this section is unlawful without regard
to whether or not the practice(1) Causes or is likely to cause competitive injury as described
in paragraph (a) of § 74.1;
(2) Was employed to meet any payment, allowance of discount
furnished by a competitor.
(c) An intermediary is prohibited from receiving, in connection with
the same sales transaction, a brokerage fee or allowance or discount in lieu
thereof from both the seller and the buyer, and is also prohibited from
receiving a brokerage fee or allowance or discount in lieu thereof from
either the seller or buyer if he,. the intermediary, is subject0 to the direct or
indirect control of the other party to the sales transaction."
In addition, section 74.2 provides:
(e) A discount or allowance by an industry member is in lieu of
brokerage if it is attributable to a reduction or elimination of brokerage
fees in connection with the sales transaction involved.
(1) A discount or allowance granted by an industry member to some
but not all customers would not under ordinary circumstances be considered
in lieu of brokerage if 39 30 Fed. Reg. 5331 (1965).
40 30 Fed. Reg.5332 (1965).
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(i) The industry member granting same makes no sales through
brokers to any of his customers, or
(ii) The industry member makes all of his sales through brokers
at the same brokerage rate.
(2) The actual basis for a discount or allowance at the time
4 1 it was
granted will indicate whether or not such was in lieu of brokerage.
The Commission offers the following as examples of violations of section
2(c):
Example No. 1. A seller sells goods sometimes through brokers and
sometimes on a direct basis, where no broker is involved. If on a direct
sale the seller deducts an amount from the price which in fact constitutes
an allowance or discount in lieu of brokerage, both the seller and the buyer
have violated paragraph (a) of this section. It is of no consequence
whether such payment or allowance is made directly by check, by deduction by the buyer from invoice price before remitting payment therefor,
by deduction from the sales price by the seller, or otherwise.
In other transactions, however, the above-described buyer may function, not as a buyer, but as a bona fide broker for the same seller, negotiate
for him a sale of goods to another party in accord with the seller's instructions and authorization and lawfully receive a brokerage fee for such
service.
Example No. 2. In order to make a sale of a large quantity of products
to a particular buyer who will not pay the seller's going price, the seller
and his broker agree that the usual brokerage fee will be reduced and that
the price to such buyer will be less than otherwise by an amount reflecting
all or part of the brokerage reduction. The sale is made to such buyer at
the reduced price. The seller, the broker and the buyer have violated
paragraph (a) of this section.
Example No. 3. A broker is in fact the purchasing agent for a large
buyer corporation and he is in all respects subject to such corporation's
supervision and control. In connection with negotiation of purchases of
goods and the handling thereof on behalf of the buyer corporation, the
broker performs certain incidental services for the sellers involved and is
paid brokerage fees by the sellers for such services. The payment of the
brokerage fees by the sellers and the receipt and acceptance thereof by the
broker are violations of paragraph (a) of this section. A broker may
receive compensation for negotiating a valid and binding sales contract
only from his principal for whom he has negotiated such contract.42
It should be noted that the FTC and members of the industry affected
by these rules gave them careful attention during the three-year conference
proceedings. They were finally promulgated after the unusual proceeding of a
public hearing held by the full Commission. Three members of the Commission
favored their promulgation and found them consistent in all respects with the
law. One member dissented, and one member did not take part in the Commission's action.
Without question, the Trade Practice Rules for the Fresh Fruit and
Vegetable Industry represent the Commission's most detailed interpretation of
section 2(c). They leave no doubt that 2(c) expresses an absolute prohibition
41
42

30 Fed. Reg. 5333 (1965).
Ibid.
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against a buyer - either directly or through one acting as his agent - receiving
brokerage or other compensation in lieu thereof from a seller on the buyer's
own purchases.
However, following the promulgation of the Trade Practice Rules for the
Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Industry, the Commission dissipated some of the
clarity of its earlier construction of the "services rendered" provision as expressed
in these rules. This came about in the Garrett-Holmes case. " The respondent
was charged with receiving brokerage or discounts in lieu thereof from some of
its suppliers in connection with its purchases of food products for its own account
for resale. In adopting the hearing examiner's findings of fact that the respondent
received brokerage or discounts in lieu thereof, the Commission issued a final
order to cease and desist. However, with one member dissenting, the Commission stated in its final order:
Here, as in F.T.C. v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 173 (1960),
"There is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the seller[s]
* * * nor that anything in its method of dealing justified its getting a discriminatory price" as "brokerage" or discounts in lieu thereof. On the basis
of the findings of fact, the examiner was correct in concluding that the

payments received by respondent violated Section 2(c) of the Clayton Act,
as amended.44

In view of its clear holding in its Trade Practice Rules for the Fresh
Fruit and Vegetable Industry that the "services rendered" provision does not
provide a basis allowing a buyer to receive brokerage on its purchases, the appendage added to the Commission's final order in this case raises more questions
than it answers. Notwithstanding this, the Commission has never directly ruled
that a buyer may receive brokerage or compensation in lieu thereof on the basis
that it rendered services to the seller.
The Commission's opinion in the Hruby case45 is not an exception to this
settled administrative practice. In this case, two members of the Commission,
with one member dissenting and two not participating, found that the discounts,
allegedly brokerage, received by the buyer-respondent were in fact not brokerage
or in lieu of brokerage but functional discounts. The majority opinion stated:
"We must conclude that the lower net prices received by Hruby are not the result
of the receipt of brokerage or discounts in lieu thereof and are not unlawful under
Section 2(c)."" In effect, therefore, the Commission held that the practice complained of in this case was not cognizable under section 2 (c).
Flotill Prods., Inc.47 involved so-called field brokers which the Commission found did not purchase for their own account. Because of this, the Commission held that the seller could lawfully pay brokerage commissions to the
field brokers. It also held that Flotill paid an unlawful allowance in lieu of
brokerage to a buyer even though this allowance was fictitiously labeled as a
promotional allowance.
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IV. Summary
Appellate adjudications and FTC administrative interpretations demonstrate
that the "services rendered" provision in section 2(c) provides no basis for
carving out an exception which would permit a buyer to receive brokerage or
a discount in lieu thereof from a seller on the buyer's purchases. The absolute
ban in section 2(c) against such diversion of brokerage, either directly or in the
form of a price reduction, has been accepted. Where it is shown that a buyer
received brokerage from a seller, directly or indirectly, there is no controlling
precedent for holding that the "services rendered" provision provides an exception to the 2 (c) prohibition.
The most frequently expressed underlying reason for this rule is that construing the provision as a general exception permitting buyers to receive brokerage on their purchases would open the door to price discriminations which the
Robinson-Patman Act, and 2 (c) in particular, was designed to prevent. The
congressional intent to eliminate preferential treatment of favored buyers through
the medium of brokerage appears to be the primary reason why both the courts
and the Commission have rejected the argument that "services rendered" provides an exception allowing buyers to receive brokerage on their purchases. This
construction has prevailed for nearly thirty years since the brokerage section first
became law. The apparent desire is to carry out expressed legislative policy
and to conform to what has judicially and administratively been determined
as the basic overall congressional purpose and design in enacting section 2(c).
The prospects for change in this policy are uncertain. Much will depend
on the selectivity exercised by the FTC in initiating actions under the brokerage
section. Filing cases under this section which would be disposed of more appropriately under section 2(a) may lead to interpretative changes which could
make the application of section 2(c) less clear and less certain. Where a price
discrimination does not involve brokerage, section 2(c) is inapplicable. The
overall statutory scheme imposes the dual obligation of first deciding whether
the preferential treatment has been effected by means of receipt of brokerage
or an allowance or discount in lieu thereof and then, if so, applying the absolute
ban as provided in the brokerage section.

